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ABSTRACT 
The use of e-Auction services has been increasing in recent years. Security requirements in conducting e-
Auctions are mainly bid privacy, anonymity and public verifiability. Most of the secure protocols 
concentrate on privacy and anonymity, which are achieved through bidder-resolved multi-party 
computation, assuming two or more trusted third parties, either through numerous auctioneers or with 
asymmetric models in which the commercial entity of an auction issuer or registration manager is 
assumed in addition to the auctioneer. Multi-attribute reverse auctions promise higher market efficiency 
and effective information exchange. This work extends and uses the existing schemes. This scheme uses 
scoring function, winner determination in multi-attribute auctions to implement public verifiability. 
Anonymity is achieved through bidder side pseudonym generation. By results and analysis we say this is 
very simple and effective scheme. This scheme ensures public verifiability and anonymity in multi-
attribute auctions without revelation of the bids received, third parties and complex communications. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
E-auction is an efficient method to buy and sell the items on the Internet. An auction is a 
mechanism based on a pair of rules, namely the allocation rule that defines which good is 
allocated to whom and the payment rule that defines the charge of the auction winner(s) [1]. A 
participant of an auction is called bidder, while the entity conducting the auction is auctioneer. 
Today, auction is a popular form of price determination in e-Commerce due to its simplicity 
and efficiency [2]. Auction is an attractive topic for the researchers to design a secure and 
practical protocol using cryptographic primitives.  
The most common and basic types of auctions based on bidding mechanism are: the open 
English auction (ascending price), the open Dutch auction (descending price), the closed Sealed 
bid auctions (first or second price, the latter also known as Vickrey auction). By different 
classification criteria, the auction also can be divided into sequential and simultaneous auction, 
single-attribute and multi-attribute auction, single-object and multi-object auction, non-
combinational and combinational auction, single auction and double auction and so on. 
According to the number of sellers and buyers, auctions can be divided into normal auction 
(one seller and many buyers) and reverse auction (many sellers and one buyer). Generally, B2C 
or C2C e-commerce auctions types often adopt normal auction, especially based on English 
auction like in eBay, while government procurement and companies purchasing through e-
marketplace are often buyer-initiated reverse auctions. 
Multi-attribute reverse auctions allow negotiation over non-price attributes such as quality, 
color, delivery time and so on [3].Multi-attribute auction is one of the rising and most beneficial 
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procurement. Parkes et al. [5] scheme is extraordinary, which used advanced techniques and 
most secured protocol for price only and multi-item auctions. We use the same protocols of [5] 
and extended the work to multi-attribute auctions. We worked on designing a scoring function, 
which is useful in finding winner in multi-attribute auctions and helped us to extend the [5] 
scheme. In addition to that we added to use [14] work in generating pseudonyms which make 
bidders anonymous during the auction.  
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. We explain related work in section 2 and describe the 
proposed protocol, phases involved in this scheme in section 3, security requirements and 
analysis in section 4, Implementation and results in section 5 and finally present our 
conclusions in section 6.  
2. RELATED WORK 
To the best of my knowledge there are only few papers dealing with security in multi-attribute 
auctions. Our target is to develop a multi-attribute reverse auction scheme with main focus on 
public verifiability and anonymity. Parkes et al. [5] scheme is efficient secure protocol for price 
only and multi-item auctions, which motivated us to extend this work to multi-attribute 
auctions. Yoones and Fathian [6] scheme is real time efficient work, in which many security 
features are achieved but they didn't deal with public verifiability. In this they clearly explained 
comparison of this protocol with their previous proposed protocols (EOBA (Electronic Online 
Bidding Auction) and SAP (Secure Auction Protocol) [7]). Rahman and Islam [8] scheme deals 
in constructing a trusted auction house. In our view protocol is not clear, no price flexibility and 
complex communications. Strecker and Seifert [9] experiment results illustrates that full 
revelation of the buyer's preferences significantly increases allocation efficiency. Hence in our 
method we reveal the preferences of auctioneer like scoring function, mechanism of selecting 
winner for increasing efficiency of scheme. Suzuki and Yokoo [10] scheme is the prime one in 
dealing with security in multi-attribute auction. This scheme applied to Vickrey auction and 
concentrated on bid privacy, public verifiability but there is no price flexibility.  
3. PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
The following protocol is proposed on basis of the scheme [5] with slight modifications for 
multi-attribute reverse auction. These modifications and protocol flow are explained clearly in 
this section. Overview in Figure 1 and its explanation are as follows: 
1. Auctioneer publishes the terms of auction, the item, attributes and weights, timing 
constraints, auction id in bulletin board. 
2. Bidders generate their unique pseudonym using generation algorithm in PDAs. 
3. Bidders register for auction specified by auctioneer. 
4. Auctioneer publishes Paillier encryption key and scoring function in bulletin board.  
5. Bidders encrypt their attributes, generates score and its cipher. Ciphers of attributes are 
sent to auctioneer are accepted only within timing constraints specified. 
6. Auctioneer publishes ciphers of all bidders. At the end of specified time he decrypts all 
ciphers to generate scores and its cipher. 
7. Auctioneer stores all details in database server. Using Testsets and Range protocol he 
generates the hand over values, which are required for anyone to verify the auction 
outcome without revealing exact values. 
8. Finally auctioneer publishes the hand over values in the bulletin board. Using hand over 
values in range protocol anyone can verify the auction outcome. 
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Figure 1. Protocol Overview 
 
Protocol includes four phases: Initialization Phase, Bidding Phase, Opening and proof 
generation Phase, Winner announcement and Verification Phase. In our protocol, there are two 
participants, Buyer (auctioneer), and Bidder (sellers) and we use Paillier cryptosystem, Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI), Certified Bulletin Board as explained in scheme [5].The following 
protocol is proposed on basis of the scheme [5] with modifications for multi-attribute reverse 
auction. These modifications and protocol flow are explained clearly in this section. Protocol 
includes four phases: Initialization Phase, Bidding Phase, Opening and proof generation Phase, 
Winner announcement and Verification Phase. In our protocol, there are two participants, 
Buyer (auctioneer), and Bidder (sellers) and we use Paillier cryptosystem, Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI), Certified Bulletin Board as explained in scheme [5]. 
3.1. Initialization Phase  
Step 1: Auctioneer posts the following information on the bulletin board: the terms of the 
auction specifying the item, Scoring function, the mechanism for selection of the winner in 
multi-attribute auction, the deadline T, an identifier ID of the auction, and a Paillier encryption 
key n. Auctioneer knows the corresponding decryption key. Paillier encryption and decryption 
and scoring function are explained as follows. 
3.1.1. Paillier Cryptosystem 
The Paillier cryptosystem [13], named after and invented by Pascal Paillier in 1999, is a 
probabilistic asymmetric algorithm for public key cryptography. It is a Trapdoor Discrete 
Logarithm Scheme. Paillier's trapdoor function is an isomorphism f: ZN × Z∗ N -> Z∗N 2. 
Where ZN is integers modulo N and Z∗ N  is the multiplicative group of integers modulo n, i.e. 
the set of integers relatively prime to n.         
 Encryption 
 c = gMrn mod n2  where M is plaintext (attribute values), c is ciphertext,  n = p. q where 
p, q are odd primes , g is an integer belongs to ZN, r is a random number in Zn* 
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Decryption  
 M = L (c Ø(n) mod n2). µ mod n , where µ= φ(n)-1mod n 
L(u) = (u-1)/n,  Ø (n)= φ(n)=(p-1) (q-1),size of Z*n,  φ is Euler’s totient function 
 
3.1.2. Scoring Function: Winner determination in Multi-attribute auctions 
Winner determination is the process of selecting the right bidder to award the business. A buyer 
in multi-attribute reverse auction tries to minimize the price while maximizing the other quality 
related attributes during the winner determination. In other words she tries to maximize her 
utility defined through a scoring function [11] [12]. A scoring function [15] combines the 
attributes to determine a score for each multi-attribute bid. A typical scoring function takes the 
following form: 
                                                                                                              K 
S = ∑ wr . fr(xr) _ P 
                                                                                                             r=1 
Where, K is the number of non-price attributes considered by the buyer, xr is the value of the rth 
attribute submitted by the supplier, wr is the weight indicating the importance given to the 
attribute, fr(.) is the valuation function associated with the attribute, and P is the bid price. The 
summation term inside S is also called the aggregate value function. The buyer maximizes the 
scoring function to selecting the supplier.  
  
Step 2: Auctioneer will sign the entire data posted on bulletin board. 
Step 3: Bidders generates pseudonym using algorithm [14] and he registers in the auctioneer's 
site using this pseudonym. 
3.2. Bidding Phase  
Step 1: Every Bidder chooses attribute values mentioned by the auctioneer like price, quality, 
delivery time, quantity etc. Bidder will find their respective scores using the scoring function 
given by auctioneer in Initialization phase. In order to create efficient test sets to prove bid 
sizes, we restrict the size of the bid so that bidi< 2t< n/2 for small t. 
Step 2: Bidders encrypts all the attribute values using the public key n (using Paillier 
algorithm) and a randomly chosen help value r [Ci=E (bidi, ri)]. They also encrypt score ,which 
is useful during verification phase. 
Step 3: Bidders then sends all ciphers to auctioneer. Finally, the bidder sign all the information 
sends to auctioneer before time T. Auctioneer returns a signed receipt to Bidder. 
Step 4: After time T Auctioneer posts the encrypted bids in bulletin board. Also signs and posts 
the Testsets for verification of limit of the bid value using range protocol, which will be 
explained in next phase. 
Step 5: Bidder who has a receipt for a bid which is not posted, can appeal her non-inclusion. 
 
3.3. Opening and proof generation Phase  
Step 1: Auctioneer decrypts all the bids using Paillier decryption key and computes the auction 
result that is score using scoring function. Also auctioneer calculates associated random 'r' 
values used for encrypting the bid for constructing the Proof of correctness. 
Step 2: Auctioneer computes the score values of all bidders and verify the score sent by them. 
He then finds the winner with maximum score. Auctioneer (uses ciphers of score instead of 
price in [5] generates hand over values using inequality proof and Testsets for proving the 
determined winner. Handover values are values which are used by anyone to verify the winner 
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published. From scheme [5] Range protocol, test sets and hand over values are explained in 
properties of Paillier cryptosystem as follows. 
3.3.1. Properties 
1. Homomorphic: E (M1 + M2) = E(M1) x E(M2),  E(k x M) = E(M)k 
2. Self-blinding: D (E (M) rn mod n2) = M 
3. Inequality comparison:  
a. Given two ciphertexts Cx= E(x) and Cy = E(y); Prover can show x > y and x ≥ y. 
Because our values x and y are integers mod n2, we can prove x > y by showing 
x ≥ y +1, provided y ≠ n -1. 
b. Due to the homomorphic properties of Paillier encryption E(x+1) = E(x) × (n+1) 
(mod n2), and so adding 1 to a value in its encrypted form is trivial. Thus, all 
ordering comparisons can be reduced to the ability to prove x ≥ y.  
c. x and y must be in the range [0, 2t ) for 2t < n/2.  
d. To prove x ≥ y both prover and verifier calculate E(x-y) = E(x) × E(y)-1 mod n2 
and P proves   0 ≤ x-y < 2t < n/2 from E(x-y) using Test set and Range protocol. 
Test Set definition: A valid test set TS for the assertion ‘‘C =E(x,r) is an 
encryption of a number x<2t < n/2” is a set of 2t encryptions  TS = {G1= E(u1, 
s1),…, G2t= E(u2t, s2t)},  where each of the powers of 2:1,2,…, 2t-1 appears 
among the ui exactly once and the remaining t values uj are all 0. Each test set’s 
elements are randomly ordered. By use of test set TS, the prover can prove that 
x<2t < n/2 using range protocol.  
Range Protocol: Let x=2t1+…………+2tl be the representation of x, a sum of 
distinct powers of 2. Auctioneer selects TS from encryptions Gj1,………..,Gjl   of  
2t1 +……+2tl  and further t-l Gjt+1………..,Gt encryptions of 0. 
                        (E (x, r)-1 . Gj1………..Gjt) (mod n2) = E (0, s) ………………………………I 
R.H.S is an encryption of 0 with help values s=(r-1 . sj1……….. sjt )(mod n)  if 
and only if indeed x=2t1+…………+2tl . Hence auctioneer has decryption key 
can know the value r, then he can hand over the set {Gj1……….. Gjt} and help 
value‘s’. Anyone can verify on their own that above equation holds and deduce 
that x<2t < n/2. 
This protocol reveals nothing to verifier beyond x<2t < n/2 because TS is a set 
of elements and randomly permutated and no information about the values. 
Consequently has no information about which encryptions of powers of 2 are 
included in {Gj1…Gjt}.Furthermore, the inclusions of t –l encryptions of 0 hides 
even the number of non-zero bits in the binary representation of x. Finally, the 
random factors sj1,………..,sjt present in the test set’s encryptions combine to a 
uniformly random s, which completely masks any information about the help 
value r in the encryption E(x, r). Consequently no information about x is 
revealed. 
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3.4. Winner announcement and Verification Phase 
Step 1: Auctioneer publishes Winner score, his pseudonym and hand over values. Auctioneer 
proves the winner computed without revealing the exact bided values. 
Step 2: Anyone can verify the result the using the test sets and hand over values in range 
protocol (as explained in Opening and proof generation Phase) posted by auctioneer on bulletin 
board. 
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
The security requirements [4] for sealed-bid auction protocol are examined as follows. 
1. Correctness: All party acts honestly the correct wining price and winner is determined 
according to auction rules. 
2. Confidentiality: No bidder knows anything other bidders bid before submits his own 
bid. This can be achieved using Paillier's probabilistic encryption. For one message we 
will get different ciphertexts none can guess messgage using ciphertext. 
3. Bidder-Anonymity: The bidder's identity cannot be disclosed to any body throughout 
the auction. This is achieved using unique user generated pseudonym algorithm. Unless 
and until bidder discloses his identity, auctioneer is not able to know the bidder. 
4. Non repudiation: After a bidder submits his bid, the bid cannot be modified. No 
bidder can deny his bid after he submits it. This is achieved by sign on all the 
information posted in bulletin board. 
5. Bid-Privacy: The losing bids are not revealed until end of the auction even to the 
auctioneer. This scheme supports weak privacy. Bids are revealed to auctioneer but 
cannot collude with anyone because he doesn't have any information except the 
pseudonym of bidder. 
6. Public verifiability: Anybody can verify the auction outcome. Using Paillier 
homomorphic properties and zero knowledge proof as explained in protocol phases this 
can be achieved. 
7. Price flexibility: Bidder able to bid any value within a range. Bidder can bid any value 
within a range, less than 2t). 
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
We implemented the public verifiability in multi-attribute auctions using scoring function and 
for anonymity we simulated the pseudonym generation using algorithm in [14]. The score 
generated using attributes values bided by bidders is used place of price in [5]. We implemented 
the protocols in java using BigInteger in java.Math and Server Configuration: Microsoft 
Windows Server 2003 R2, Standard edition Service pack 2, Intel® Xeon™,CPU 3.60 GHz, 
3.12 GB of RAM. Our results are quite good and took less time. By analyzing results we can 
say that it can be easily deployed in real time for multi-attribute auctions public verifiability. 
Summary of our results are in table 1 and 2 respectively. 
Table 1. Proof Preparation. 
Key size (in bits) Number of bids Time(in milliseconds) 
512 100 954266 
512 200 7115140 
512 300 8610937 
1024 100 7115140 
1024 200 27897281 
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Table 2. Verification. 
Key size (in bits) Number of bids Time(in milliseconds) 
512 100 56010 
512 200 232672 
512 300 541407 
1024 100 1289906 
1024 200 1475297 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The proposed scheme aims in secure multi-attribute reverse auction which focuses mainly on 
public verifiability and anonymity in multi-attribute auctions. Our work includes public 
verifiability and anonymity in multi-attribute auctions are implemented using Parkes et al [5] 
scheme and Peter’s [14] unique user generated digital pseudonym algorithm. Highlight of the 
scheme are using scoring function and without revealing the exact values public verifiability is 
achieved. This scheme is not complex or costly because no trusted parties and no distributed 
computation involved. This scheme is simple, secure enough, easy to implement and efficient 
as per our results and analysis. 
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